本文比較台灣立法院協商體制在透明化改革前後，其功能與產出的差異。蒐集第八、九、十屆立法院進入二讀的法案資料進行比較，發現在透明化後，從密室協商無表決，變成表決法案多走向公開化的協商。當委員會審過的二讀法案進入協商不減反增，院會表決也隨之增加。改革預期與實踐結果的落差，產生「透明化悖論」現象：透明化後，協商成為眾所矚目的政治表態舞台，院長協商的獨大性更被強化，取代委員會成為二讀法案處理的主要場域，協商的產出則程序爭執取代法案妥協，以協商之名成為院會表決的論述動員熱身場。

Our study investigates how the functions and outcomes of the party negotiation mechanisms in Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan (LY) changed following the implementation of transparency reforms. Specifically, it analyzes bills that reached the second reading stage during the 8th, 9th, and 10th LY. The findings reveal a significant transformation: closed-door negotiations, where floor votes are rare, gave way to open negotiations in which voting became a regular and essential part of the legislative process. The proportion of bills reviewed by committees but later referred to negotiations increased, accompanied by a rise in floor votes. A “transparency paradox” emerged with negotiations evolving into platforms for political posturing, and Speaker-led negotiations increasingly replacing committee deliberations. Moreover, procedural bargaining overshadowed substantive compromises, transforming negotiations into stages for rhetorical mobilization and floor vote arrangement.