從交易成本的觀點來探討公共組織的階層結構   全文下載

The Study of Hierarchical Structure in Public Organization from Transaction Cost Perspective

本文試圖以交易成本分析公共組織的階層。亦即，探究其根據交易成本-機會主義預期成本與治理成本而變動的「無政府階層-政府階層」連續體：機會主義的預期成本愈低，或是治理成本愈高，組織行動者愈可能選擇較為無政府階層的結構；機會主義的預期成本愈高，或是治理成本愈低，組織行動者愈可能選擇較為政府階層的結構，並以公共組織的最適階層數作總結。

This essay attempts to analyze the hierarchy of public organization by transaction costs. That is, exploring the movement of ''anarchy-hierarchy'' continuum by its transaction costs-expected costs of opportunism and governance costs: organizational actors may choose more anarchic structures as expected costs of opportunism decreases or governance costs increases and more hierarchic structures as expected costs of opportunism increases or governance costs decreases, finally it concludes the optimal hierarchy of public organization.