中國反壟斷執法機構間的競爭－－行為模式、執法效果與剛性權威的克服

Competition between China's Antimonopoly Law Authorities: Conduct Model, Performence of Enforcement and Prevention of Rigid Authoritativeness

中國《反壟斷法》由三家機構競爭性執法是既有權力格局延續的產物。出於對執法衝突與執法懈怠的擔憂，學術界和實務界普遍認為應當統一反壟斷執法機構。但是，反壟斷執法機構之間的競爭改變了科層組織完成目標所面臨的關鍵因素。競爭產生了更便於比較的信息，從而在被動的監督與主動的執法上區別於壟斷性執法模式。在對中國《反壟斷法》執法實際狀況的分析中可以看到，執法競爭克服了現有反壟斷執法機構在科層結構中地位低、資源少的限制，在顯性與非顯性指標上都有較好的表現。與理論預設不同，現實中執法競爭的負面效果主要表現在剛性權威上。由於執法機構之間的競爭，加上反壟斷執法機構面臨寬鬆的制度約束以及法院改判的壓力，可能引發執法退讓與執法逼迫的雙重效果。對此，提升執法的透明度，並通過反壟斷民事訴訟以推動法律實施上的競爭是重要舉措。

Three authorities competing for law enforcement of Anti-monopoly law is the outcome of existing bureaucratic structure. Given the concerns of conflict and slack of enforcement, both academy and practice societies suggest establishing an unified anti-monopoly law enforcement institute. The competition of anti-monopoly authorities changed the key factors of achieving a goal in a bureaucratic organization. The competition among authorities generates more comparable information and distinguishes the monopoly authority from passive supervision and active enforcement. Based on the analysis of anti-monopoly law enforcement, the competition of law enforcement solves the certain issues of current law enforcement, e. g. low level in the bureaucratic system and limited resources. It performs well in terms of explicit and implicit indicators. Different from theoretie hypothesis, the impacts of competition in law enforcement are mainly caused by rigid authoritativeness. Competition in law enforcement under relatively loose system constraints and press caused by changing conclusion by a court, it may lead to recession of enforcement or compelling enforcement. In order to deal with it, it is important to promote the transparency of law enforcement and enhance civil procedure law of anti-monopoly.