英文摘要 |
This objective of this paper is to evaluate the fairness regarding the mechanism of government grants to private universities and colleges. The government gives financial support to private universities and colleges with good performance according to Private School Law. The ultimate grants by Ministry of Education may be bias when school performance indicators cannot reflect substance of the effort made by schools. The principal-agent problem arises under conditions of incomplete and asymmetric information when the principal hires an agent. The government is the owner of grants whereas school is the agent to deal with government financial supports. Schools receive government grants based on performance measures. On the other hand, the government allocates the resource of educational expense fairly and efficiently according to signals released. Adjusted over time, government grants will reflect the substance of school performance when the mechanism regarding government grants effectively captures performance measures under the circumstances of no interference. The analyses are based on data collected from 2004 to 2008. The empirical results show that over time, the magnitude of change regarding government grants will be approach to zero when the school’s performance is relatively stable. That is when the school’s performance fixed on a certain level, the magnitude of change regarding government grants will tend to converge. It indicates that Regulations for Subsidy and Award Regarding Private Universities and Colleges can evaluate the school’s performance effectively, capture performance measures, and allocate the resource of educational expense fairly and efficiently. |