本文在垂直相關市場下，研究生產最終財過程中會造成環境污染的垂直整合廠商與獨立下游廠商，承擔環境企業社會責任（environmental corporate social responsibility, ECSR）的誘因。研究結果發現，垂直整合廠商的優勢策略為選擇不承擔 ECSR。當單位產出的污染損害程度相對較小時，獨立下游廠商也選擇不承擔ECSR，而此賽局之均衡結果為兩家廠商都不承擔ECSR。當單位產出的污染損害程度相對較大時，獨立下游廠商選擇承擔ECSR，此賽局之均衡結果是不對稱的、混合的ECSR。在垂直相關市場中，因為中間財市場的價格效果，無論政府是否制定環境政策，獨立下游廠商皆會有自發性的誘因選擇承擔ECSR。

This study investigates the incentives for environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) for a vertically integrated firm and a purely downstream firm in the production of final goods, where environmental pollution is generated in a vertically related market. The dominant strategy of a vertically integrated firm is to not undertake ECSR. When the marginal polluting intensity of output is relatively small, the independent downstream firm also chooses not to undertake ECSR, resulting in an equilibrium in which neither firm engages in ECSR. However, when the marginal polluting intensity of output is relatively large, the independent downstream firm chooses to undertake ECSR, leading to an equilibrium characterized by asymmetric, mixed ECSR outcomes. These findings remain robust irrespective of the existence of governmental environmental interventions.