新聞於網站平台之議價結構探討

An Exploration of the Bargaining Structure Between News Media and Digital Platforms

本研究探討當代數位平台與新聞機構間之議價結構困境。本文主張：在資訊資本主義之網絡社會中，真正的議價標的已從梅鐸(Murdoch)式媒體併購年代之實體資產（電子媒體、紙媒、執照、市佔），轉移至平台所獨佔之「隱形資產」──演算法決策權與使用者個資資料庫；此類資產既無公開市價、亦無對價交換機制，完全由平台單方喊價，使「新聞有價」原則之實踐面臨制度真空。本文以寇斯定理與科司特(Castells)之資訊資本主義論述為雙軸理論框架，前者提供「產權界定」之制度工具，後者揭示資訊資本不對稱之結構成因，二者互補方足以承接此一典範轉移。在此理論基礎上，本文比較分析美國、加拿大、歐盟、澳洲之新聞議價立法，並回應台灣脈絡下之政策草案與學界倡議，進而提出三項理論命題與政策建議。

This paper investigates the bargaining structure between digital platforms and news organizations under informational capitalism. It argues that the genuine object of bargaining has shifted from the tangible assets of the Murdoch-era media conglomerates (press ownership, broadcasting licenses, audience share) to the invisible informational assets monopolized by platforms—algorithmic decision-making and user data infrastructures. Such assets possess no public market price and enter no reciprocal exchange; they are unilaterally priced by their holders, thereby creating an institutional vacuum in which the principle that ''news has value'' cannot be effectively implemented. The paper adopts a dual-axis theoretical framework combining the Coase Theorem and Manuel Castells' discourse on informational capitalism: the former offers institutional tools for property delineation, while the latter diagnoses the structural asymmetry of informational capital. Only their combination can adequately account for this paradigmatic shift. Building on this framework, the paper comparatively analyzes news bargaining legislation in the United States, Canada, the European Union, and Australia, and addresses the context of Taiwan through its policy drafts and academic advocacy, ultimately proposing three theoretical propositions and corresponding policy recommendations.