解嚴初期情治機關的政治考量與「獨臺會案」偵辦始末

Political Calculations and the“Taiwan Independence Association Case”in Early Post-Martial Law Taiwan: The Making of an Investigation

1991年5月「獨臺會案」反映解嚴初期情治機關在政治考量下的選擇性偵辦：對單純「言論」趨向容忍，但對涉及「組織化」的行動，以《懲治叛亂條例》、《中華民國刑法》第100條加以嚴懲。情治機關並掌握著「言論」與「組織」的模糊解釋權，循低成本鎮壓原則選擇性執法，鎖定陳正然、廖偉程、王秀惠、林銀福（MasaoNikar）等非檯面人物，藉該等的背景及社會關係，向勞工、校園、原運、教會等社運力量示警，迎合行政院長郝柏村不能姑息臺獨的強硬立場，並藉本案遏制臺獨聯盟自美遷臺行動。
本案偵辦關鍵在於情治系統的長期佈建。國家安全局循解嚴前的辦案模式主導情資整合與內線工作方式。法務部調查局以長期打入史明的偵破佈建林榮來（「青山」）為核心取證，掌握交付傳單、印刷《獨臺會革命綱領》與宣誓入會等「著手實行」證據，並與檢方在審理中掩護其身分，調查局事後擬給重獎感謝，「用掉」長期培養的內線，顯示本案非外界所稱烏龍辦案。政治決策上，總統李登輝對偵辦步調事前知情，折射出其在權力平衡與安撫保守派的考量下核可收網行動。
然而，情治機關錯估野百合學運後的社會動能，過度自信，以為掌握足夠證據便能壓制外界質疑，未事前知會清華大學校方即逮捕廖偉程，成為案件失控的破口，引發校園與社會大規模抗爭，促成《懲治叛亂條例》提早廢止。然獨臺會案並非終點，在1992年5月《刑法》第100條修正前，檢調仍持續以預備內亂等罪名偵辦後續臺獨案件。儘管輿論高喊「反政治迫害」，國安局仍將本案視為敵我政治鬥爭，以「依法辦案」自我辯護並推動反制宣傳，顯示其面對臺獨的敵我框架並未鬆動；即使修法後，情治機關的監控與政治操作亦未隨之停止。

The 1991“Taiwan Independence Association Case”(Tutaihui Case) illustrates the selective prosecution carried out by Taiwan’s security and intelligence agencies in the early post-martial law period under shifting political considerations. As the state moved toward conditional tolerance of Taiwan independence advocacy as protected“speech,”it continued to criminalize“organized activities”through the Betrayers Punishment Act and Article 100 of the Criminal Code. By retaining interpretive authority over the blurred boundary between speech and organized activities, security agencies implemented a strategy of low-cost repression, targeting relatively non-prominent activists while using their social networks to signal deterrence to workers, students, the Indigenous, and church-based movements. This approach aligned with Premier Hau Pei-tsun’s hardline stance against Taiwan independence and aimed to discourage the relocation of the World United Formosans for Independence (WUFI) to Taiwan.
The investigation relied on long-term strategic intelligence infiltration and interagency coordination. The National Security Bureau integrated intelligence and directed covert operations based on pre-martial law investigative models, while the Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau built its case primarily on testimony from a long-term undercover informant, Lin Jung-lai, who had infiltrated Su Beng’s circle. Evidence of the“commencement of execution”included leaflet delivery, printing of the Tutaihui Revolutionary Platform, and membership oath-taking. Prosecutors also took steps to conceal the informant’s identity, and the Investigation Bureau later rewarded him, effectively exhausting a long-cultivated undercover asset. These dynamics indicate that the case was not a botched operation, as later critics suggested, but a politically calculated enforcement action. Evidence further indicates that President Lee Teng-hui was aware of and approved the timing of the crackdown as part of a broader effort to balance political pressures and reassure conservative forces.
However, the intelligence agencies misjudged the social momentum unleashed by the Wild Lily Student Movement. Confident in the sufficiency of their evidence, they arrested Liao Wei-cheng in a National Tsing Hua University dormitory without prior coordination, triggering widespread protests that accelerated the repeal of the Betrayers Punishment Act. However, the Tutaihui Case continued to shape subsequent prosecutions. Even before the May 1992 revision of Article 100, authorities pursued additional Taiwan independence cases under preparatory rebellion charges. Despite widespread criticism against such political persecution, the National Security Bureau maintained a friend-foe framework, defending its actions as“lawful enforcement”while continuing counterpropaganda efforts. This suggests that despite legal reform, the underlying logic of surveillance and political control persisted within Taiwan’s intelligence apparatus.