| 英文摘要 |
The core proposition of the Song Confucian ontology, of either benevolence as the foundation or benevolence encompassing the four virtues, accurately characterizes the content and origins of moral normativity in Confucian ethics. For the issue of how to understand normativity, Zhu Xi adopted a tripartite intellectualist approach: epistemologically, he took the activation of the heart/mind that distinguishes right from wrong as the starting point for illustrating illustrious virtue (ming mingde); methodologically, he directed the intellectual virtue’s function of discrimination toward normative facts represented by the reason for the existence of things (suoyiran zhi li) and the reason according to which things should exist (suodangran zhi ze); teleologically, he oriented self-cultivation toward the perfection of intellectual virtue. In response to critiques accusing him of approaching morality through intellectual knowledge and of confusing moral knowledge with empirical knowledge, Zhu Xi addressed the former criticism through his understanding of gewu as integrating internal and external while prioritizing the internal. Furthermore, he addressed the latter through his view that moral perception and ordinary perception share the same cognitive function of intellectual virtue—possessing agent-relative characteristics within a moral realist framework. These positions can be summarized as intellectual virtue serving as the epistemological precondition and practical foundation for all virtues, which itself presupposes the overarching proposition that benevolence constitutes the ontological foundation of all virtues. |