| 英文摘要 |
This paper adopts the concept of the“diaspora community,”integrating a dual framework of cultural and political identity to analyze the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) classification of united front targets. Using Kinmen as a case study, it explores the mechanisms behind the CCP’s united front operations in this specific context. The CCP adopts differentiated strategies based on the identity positions of diaspora communities. Although Kinmen and Taiwan are both viewed by the CCP as“to-be-unified”diaspora regions, the growing divergence in their cultural identities has led the CCP to reassess Kinmen’s strategic significance and apply an approach distinct from that used toward Taiwan. It attempts to maintain routine cross-strait exchanges and the“China image”of Kinmen residents, while also precisely targeting their economic demands with relevant policy initiatives and manipulating their emotions to divide Kinmen from Taiwan. Kinmen residents tend to interpret the united front as a resource to be strategically utilized, highlighting their agency and self-interest in navigating these political overtures. United front work, therefore, should be understood as a complex, interactive process. Despite the CCP’s attempts to ease identity tensions through the united front work, the efforts face inherent limitations. As either“secondary enemies”or“united front force,”diaspora communities may not necessarily comply with the CCP’s directives and agendas. |