人與物的圖像──從哲學人類學看列維納斯對於海德格的批評

Image of Man and Things: Levinas’s Critique of Heidegger in the View of Philosophical Anthropology

《整體與無限》作為列維納斯兩部主要著作之一，統整其早期的思想發展、並首先清楚地勾勒出其整體哲學的構想，亦即：「從存有到存在物、再從存在物到他者」。因此，本文嘗試藉著論述於其中列維納斯對海德格在《存有與時間》中「人」與「物」之概念的批評、將列維納斯跟海德格思想之間的關係闡明，以清楚呈現列維納斯哲學的脈絡與其關切的根源。列維納斯批判傳統哲學及海德格藉著理性與存有作為同一者消弭他異性；反對海德格對於事物作為工具之目的性、將事物解消作為跟人最根本接觸的元素，以及顛覆海德格對人嚴肅追求意義的關切、並因此主張人的生活即是享受，事物是人享受的對象。在詳盡地描繪「人的圖像」之後，他即順理成章地闡述我們對同樣作為人之他者的倫理責任。

Totality and Infinity is one of two Levinas’s main works which integrates the development of his early thought and first clearly depicts the whole of his philosophy, namely,“from Being to beings, then from beings to the other”. This essay hence attempts to explicate Levinas’s critique of Heidegger’s conception of“man”and“thing”in Being and Time by expounding the relation between the thoughts of Levinas and Heidegger, to present the context of his philosophy and the source of its concern. Levinas criticizes that the traditional philosophy and Heidegger erase otherness by the Reason and Being as the same. He opposes Heidegger’s teleological idea of things as instruments, decomposing them into elements with which man has fundamental contact, and subverts Heidegger’s care of man’s earnest searching for meaning; therefore, he contends that man’s life is enjoyment and things are the objects of man’s enjoyment. After delineating“the image of man”, Levinas consequently elucidates our ethical responsibility for the other who is a human like us.