近世薩摩與琉球的對外隱蔽策略──以十七至十九世紀薩摩船的漂流事例為中心

Satsuma and Ryukyu’s Concealment Strategies in Foreign Relations during the Early Modern Period: A Study Centered on Satsuma Ships’Drifting Incidents from the Seventeenth to the Nineteenth Century

本文聚焦於迄今為止較少關注的薩摩船漂抵朝鮮、清朝之例，藉由比對朝、日、清各方紀錄，掌握到薩摩藩對清嚴密隱蔽，對於朝鮮則除琉球人搭乘之例以外，並未積極隱蔽薩琉關係，其原因為薩藩不同於琉球，原則上依循幕府的「鎖國」、禁教政策，因此未另對朝鮮採取嚴密的隱蔽策略。此外自1609年薩藩出兵琉球後，掌握薩琉關係的朝鮮，原則上根據漂流民的自陳，依循日朝漂流民送還制度，使其自力回航或經由對馬藩送還回國，則薩藩漂抵朝鮮之船，無論是否採取隱蔽措施，原則上並不影響琉清關係，因而可見薩藩隱蔽措施的不一致性。
另一方面，原為薩藩主動推行的隱蔽策略，歷經明清交替後，琉球的主導性逐漸增強，對此相關研究主要歸因於明清交替期間幕府、薩藩以清琉關係為優先的態度，然琉球主動、薩藩看似轉為配合的姿態，各自經濟、政治因素的考量，亦是不可忽視的重要因素之一。因琉球與清朝間封貢關係所需之資金、商品等須仰賴薩藩調度、銷售，薩藩雖藉由出資朝貢貿易所獲的經濟利益有限，但善用琉球為朝貢國第二的身分晉升官位，提升國內地位，成為日後成功向幕府增加銷售中國商品數額的有利條件，即琉薩對清嚴密的隱蔽策略實為相互依存、各取所需之舉。此外，如朝、清皆掌握薩琉關係，則隱蔽策略真正目的便是為了創造「琉球獨立自主之國」的形象。不僅薩藩可從中受惠，也能為琉球創造牽制薩藩監管、爭取自主性的有利條件，亦可避免無國交往來的清日之間的對外體制衝突。

This article focuses on cases of ships from the Satsuma Domain drifting to Joseon Korea and Qing China, which have received relatively little attention until now. By comparing records from Joseon, Japan, and Qing China, this study reveals that while Satsuma tried to conceal its relations with Ryukyu from Qing China, it did not attempt to do the same with Joseon, except in cases where Ryukyuan passengers were involved. This is because, unlike Ryukyu, Satsuma generally adhered to the shogunate’s closed-country and anti-Christian policies, and therefore did not implement strict concealment strategies towards Joseon. Additionally, after Satsuma's invasion of Ryukyu in 1609, Joseon, aware of the Satsuma-Ryukyu relationship, generally followed the standard repatriation system for Japanese and Korean castaways based on their testimonies. Satsuma castaways were typically repatriated either independently or via Tsushima, meaning that Satsuma ships drifting to Joseon did not affect Ryukyu-Qing relations, regardless of any concealment measures taken. This reflects the inconsistent application of Satsuma's concealment policies.
On the other hand, while Satsuma initially implemented the concealment strategy proactively, Ryukyu’s role gradually grew more dominant following the Ming-Qing transition. Previous studies attribute this shift primarily to the priority given to Qing-Ryukyu relations by the shogunate and Satsuma during this period. However, economic and political considerations for both Ryukyu and Satsuma were also critical factors. Ryukyu depended on Satsuma’s resources and distribution channels for the funds and goods required for its tributary relationship with Qing China. Although Satsuma’s economic gains from financing tribute trade were limited, it leveraged Ryukyu’s status as a secondary tributary nation to enhance its own official rank and domestic standing. This, in turn, provided favorable conditions for increasing sales of Chinese goods to the shogunate. Thus, the strict concealment strategy towards Qing China was a mutually beneficial arrangement, allowing both Satsuma and Ryukyu to achieve their respective goals.
Furthermore, since both Joseon and Qing China were likely aware of Satsuma-Ryukyu relations, the concealment strategy’s true purpose was to foster an image of Ryukyu as an independent and autonomous nation. This strategy not only benefited Satsuma but also provided Ryukyu with favorable conditions to resist Satsuma’s oversight and assert its autonomy, while avoiding conflicts with the foreign policy structures of Qing China and Japan, with which Ryukyu had no formal diplomatic relations.