| 英文摘要 |
Democratic accountability requires transparency. After electoral de-mocratization has been achieved in Taiwan, citizens have become the bosses of the nation. However, because of the problem of information (or profes-sional) asymmetry in democratic governance, citizens are usually bosses in name only. People’s frustration over corruption in recent Taiwan has led the citizen-government trust relationship into a vicious cycle. It is urgent to re-build trust by institutionally committing reforms which can place govern-ment activities under the sunlight or in a fishbowl. In this paper, the author utilizes the economics of information to analyze the reform efforts of pro-moting transparency through administrative procedural controls. The author concludes that: First, the central idea of administrative procedural controls is to solve the problems of information asymmetry between citizenry and gov-ernment. Second, the moral ground for this reform is the idea that the prop-erty rights of government information belong to the citizenry. Third, the key effect of procedural openness is a reasonable linkage between the rules of the game and the ensuing results. Such a linkage is made possible by the designing of an information policy instrument with the nature of pre-commitment. Lastly, administrative procedural controls require responses to the problem of strategic reactions between those controlled personnel in the government and citizen controller outside of the government. |
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