「阻止救助行為之因果歷程」之考察－－評述最高裁判所令和2年8月24日之判決

An Examination of the Causal Process of Obstructing Rescue Actions: Commentary on the Supreme Court Judgment of August 24, 2020

本文探討了阻止第三人救助行為所引發的法律問題，特別是從因果關係與刑法理論角度分析其犯罪構成。文章首先介紹了案件的事實背景與判決要旨，指出被告透過心理上的限制，使應實施救助行為者未能履行其救助義務，從而導致有害結果的發生。接著，本文深入討論了阻止救助行為的性質，分析其屬於「作為」還是「不作為」，以及在不同情況下可能成立的犯罪類型，包括「直接正犯」與「間接正犯」的區別。最後，本文總結指出，阻止救助行為應被認定為「作為」犯罪，而非第三行為類型。本文認為，在本案中，被告利用被害人的父母作為工具，應構成殺人罪的間接正犯。此外，本文還探討了共同正犯的成立要件，認為若被告與有保護責任者共同實施不法行為，則可成立共同正犯。

This paper examines the legal issues arising from obstructing third-party rescue actions, particularly analyzing its criminal constitution from the perspectives of causality and criminal law theory. It first introduces the factual background and key points of the court’s judgment, noting that the defendant psychologically restricted the individual obligated to perform the rescue, resulting in harmful outcomes. The paper then delves into the nature of obstructing rescue actions, discussing whether it constitutes an act or an omission, and the possible types of crimes in different situations, including the distinction between“direct perpetrator”and“indirect perpetrator.”Finally, the paper concludes that obstructing rescue actions should be recognized as an“act”crime rather than a third type of action. The paper argues that in this case, the defendant used the victim’s parents as tools, constituting the indirect perpetrator of murder. Additionally, the paper explores the requirements for establishing joint principal offenders, asserting that if the defendant and the person with a duty to protect jointly commit illegal actions, they can be considered joint principal offenders.