英文摘要 |
The rivalry in North China between China and Japan in the 1930s largely originated from the Japanese invasion of Rehe on February 23, 1933. Chinese and Japanese historians, however, have maintained different interpretations as to why the Japanese launched the Battle of Rehe. In order to analyze the discursive context surrounding Japan’s policy of invading China, the present article first explains the complete picture of the Battle of Rehe from the perspective of Japan’s Kwantung Army. Second, taking the reasons why the Chinese Nationalist government could not dismiss Chairman Tang Yulin湯玉麟(1871–1949) of Rehe province before the war as a research thread, it explores the symbiotic relationship between Chiang Kai-shek蔣介石(1887–1975), Zhang Xueliang張學良(1901–2001), and Tang Yulin in North China, using this to analyze the causes and consequences of the Nationalist government’s defeat in the Battle of Rehe. Third, this article focuses on the dismissal of Zhang Xueliang and the offensive and defensive deployment of the Beijing Branch Military Commission at various passes of the Great Wall, as well as discussing the central government’s entry into North China and the struggles of the National Army at these passes. Finally, based on Chiang Kai-shek’s different considerations in the ordering of regions in terms of importance when implementing anti-Japanese aggression policies as well as on a comparison between the Japanese government’s and the Japanese armed forces’policies towards China, this article explores how Huang Fu黃郛(1883–1936), who played a buffer role, became the new balance of the leadership in North China, one which could be accepted by both the Chinese and Japanese governments; moreover, the historical significance of the Tanggu Truce is analyzed, namely how it gained space and time for Chiang to prepare for war. |