英文摘要 |
Dwight D. Eisenhower utilized the National Security Council to integrate, coordinate his policy objectives in the conduct of foreign policy, and thereby strengthened his leadership. After careful review of current scholarship, using organization as an approach does little to explaining what shapes bureaucrats’perception of foreign-policy objectives, nor does it provide the rationale behind policy initiatives. This article examines the gap between the bureaucratic perception of“neutralism”and Sihanouk’s understanding of“neutrality”through the bureaucratic behavior model, presenting interpretation for the U.S. and Cambodia positions. Eisenhower’s decision-making bureaucrats believed that Cambodia could become a pro-American regime through military or economic aid; however, the Sihanouk government voluntarily established a“neutral”status and incorporated Neutral Law into the constitution. The inclination of pro-China policy is the main reason that catalyzed Dap Chhuon Plot. The study has found that Eisenhower’s foreign policy in Cambodia lacked of consistency because the decision-making bureaucrats interpreted Sihanouk’s“neutrality”policy differently, resulting in bureaucratic debates within the State Department and debates between the Secretary of State and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. |