英文摘要 |
The triumph of the Chinese Communist Party in the Chinese Civil War, as a significant event in the history of Sino-US diplomatic relations, exerted a profound impact on the relationship between the two countries. In 1949, US Secretary of State Dean Acheson (1893–1971) presented the“China white paper”titled United States Relations with China: With Special Reference to the Period 1944–1949 as a defense of his China policy, blaming the Kuomintang-led government for the failure of the Civil War. But Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975) and his government responded to the criticism quietly, largely attempting to retain American aid. After Dwight D. Eisenhower (1890–1969) was elected as president of the United States, Foreign Relations of the United States, China series, was published to release the official papers on China in full and repudiate the Truman administration’s white paper, but the two documents were ultimately quite similar in content. In the 1960s, to counter the China series, the government of Chiang Kai-shek adopted certain propaganda measures and published General Stilwell in China, 1942–1944: The Full Story, attempting to settle the decade-old score. The present study reveals not only Chiang Kai-shek and his administration’s perception of the loss of China but also the patterns of propaganda formulated under stresses emanating from the US. As this research holds, Chiang Kai-shek was certain that the US should shoulder a larger responsibility for the defeat of the KMT in the Civil War, especially Acheson, George C. Marshall, Jr. (1880–1959), and State Department officers and diplomats in China, all of which carried out the policy of destroying him under the“influence of the Soviet Union.”His views shared similarities with those of US Senator Joseph McCarthy (1908–1957) in the 1950s and led to the birth of General Stilwell in China, which was popular in Taiwan but received mixed reviews in the US because of Stilwell’s reputation and shifting opinions on the“loss of China.” |