英文摘要 |
Single non-transferable vote, the system Taiwan adopts, is a unique electoral system. Given this system, Kuomintang used to be the only party which could equalize vote by using“responsibility zone system”to mobilize and allocate potential votes of its electorate to gain more seats in the Legislative Yuan. Without strong local organizations as KMT did, Democratic progressive party (DPP) and New Party (NP) still tried to look for alternative ways to mobilize their supporters to equalize vote and thereby maximized their seats in Legislative Yuan elections. Nowadays, the success of vote equalization depends not only on the parties’mobilization ability but also on voters’cooperation. Voters also try as much to equalize the votes as the political parties do to ensure the victory of their preferable candidates. In addition to following political parties’instructions, some voters allocate votes within their family and among their friends. The purpose of this article is to find out factors that encourage voters to equalize their votes. The author tries to figure out that what kinds of voters would follow his or her parties’instruction of vote equalization and voluntarily allocate their votes with family and friends in private. Based on the data set collected in the 2001 Taiwan’s Election and Democratization Study (TEDS), I examine whether the vote choice of Taiwanese is on the basis of strategic considerations. The results show significant statistical association between vote equalization and variables such as sex, ethnicity, education, information, and party identification direction in the 2001 Legislative Yuan election. |