另一種戰爭：1942年國民政府對英屬緬甸的政治情蒐及宣傳

A Different Kind of War: The Chinese Nationalist Government's Political Intelligence and Its Propagandist Activities in British Burma Before and After the Burma Campaign, 1942

本文主要運用中英官方檔案，輔以日記、回憶錄等資料，從政治戰、情報戰與宣傳戰層面，探討1942年緬戰前後國府對英緬政治情蒐反宣傳工作。首先鋪陳日軍南進總體戰略衝擊，其次以兩件蔣中正（1887-1975）批交國民黨中央黨部秘書長等參考之關鍵情報為中心，說明緬戰前夕國府對英緬政情之認識與策略評估，各主要情報機構皆有活動呈報；復次探討緬戰爆發後國府「對緬國民外交實施方案」內容及其執行困境；再次探討國府與英緬國防局約定合作，以及緬甸陷日後，國研所主任王芃生（1893-1946）向英方高層之宣傳提議過程與結果；最末析論第一次緬戰前後國府對英緬政治工作策略得失，尤其是戰時情報機構與外交系統分頭進行、各方競爭情形，對國府與英方情報反宣傳合作的後續影響。

This paper draws upon government documents of the R.O.C. and the U.K., supplemented by diaries, memoirs, etc., and examines the Chinese Nationalist Governmen's political intelligence and propagandist activities in British Burma before and after the outbreak of the Burma Campaign, 1942, from the perspective of the political war, the intelligence war and the propaganda war. Firstly, it delineates the impact of Japan's southern advance as historical background and examines the Chinese Nationalist Government's understanding and strategic assessment of the British Burmese political situation as well as the activities of its intelligence agencies on the eve of the campaign by focusing on two reports that Chiang Kai-shek (1887-1975) handed over to the Kuomintang's Secretary-General and others for reference. This is followed by discussions of ''People's Diplomacy Implementation Plan for Burma'' and its implementation difficulties, the cooperation between the Chinese Nationalist Government and the Burma Defense Bureau, and the propaganda proposal to high-level British officials by Wang Peng-sheng (1893-1946), director of the Institute of International Relations (IIR) after the fall of Burma. Finally, it analyzes the success and failure of the Chinese Nationalist Government's intelligence efforts in Burma during this time, especially the competitions among intelligence agencies and diplomatic system, and their impact on the Nationalist China-U.K. relationship of cooperation in intelligence and propaganda.