我國立法院朝野黨團協商機制：理性選擇制度主義的初步分析

China's] legislative consultation system governing and opposition parties: Rational choice institutionalism preliminary analysis

政治學的研究從50、60年代的行為主義興起，到70年代的理性選擇理論、新制度主義、新自由制度主義，乃至80年代的認同政治學，而這些從不同研究途徑出發的理論，其中，除了行為主義的分析之外，新制度主義特別對於國會研究有較多的運用。本文嘗試以新制度主義中的理性選擇制度主義，做為分析台灣立法院朝野黨國協商制度的研究途徑，並試圖將理論面與實務面的分析面向結合起來，並加入政治利益算計對於國會運作的影響，希望能對於複雜的立法院朝野互動進行更精確的解釋與分析。歷經第一波（第三屆立法院）與第二波（第四屆立法院）的國會改革，立法院建立以朝野黨國協商制度為運作核心的議事審查機制，而在歷經第五屆、第六屆，乃至第七屆立法院的運作之後，原本為促進議事效率而設計的朝野黨國協商制度，弊端叢生，外界依然批評聲浪不斷，更有立法委員本身將朝野協商形容成必要之惡，也有立法委員認為朝野黨國協商是一體兩面的設計，改善了過去法案被杯葛、延宕的困境，但密室的黨團協商，也常有利益迴避、為特定團體護航的問題，而朝野黨國協商有時也得扮演過濾與把關的角色。在2005年修憲將立法委員總數從225席，減少為113席，並將選舉制度從複數選區變更為單一選區兩票制之後，2008年1月12日選出第七屆的新國會，也在此制度下繼續運作。在此制度之下，朝野政黨的互動呈現怎樣的面貌？台灣的立法院到底是扮演著橡皮圖章，或者監督行政部門的制衡力量？這勢必從了解立法院議事運作的核心－朝野黨團協商制度開始。

The research on Political science from the rise of behaviorism in the 1950s and 1960s to the rational choice theory in the 1970s, new institutionalism, the neo- liberal institutionalism and even the identity politics in the 1980s. Among those various theories starting from different approaches, in addition to behavioral analysis, the new institutionalism particularly has more use to the Congressional Research. This article attempts to analyze the Party caucus negotiation policy in Taiwan Legislative Yuan consultation system between the governing and opposition parties with the rational choice institutionalism, and combine theoretically and practically all the analysis and join the political interests of the calculation for the impact of the parliament, as well, hoping to more accurately interpret and analyze the interaction between the complex governing and opposition parties. After the legislative reforms in the first session (the Third Legislative Yuan) and the second (the fourth legislature), the Legislative Yuan established a consultation system between the governing and opposition parties as the main review mechanism, however, after the Fifth, sixth, and even seventh Legislative Yuan, the consultation system, originally designed to promote the efficiency of procedure of the governing and opposition parties, has been criticized all the time because of offending and abusing, In addition, legislators themselves described the system as necessary Evil while some legislators thought it a kind of designing on both sides of improving the bill by boycotting in the past, the plight of delay, but the chamber's party caucus negotiation often caused some problems of avoiding conflicts of interest, and defending some specific groups. Sometimes consultation between governing and opposition parties has to play the role of filtering and gatekeeper. Constitutional amendment in 2005 reduced the number of legislators to 113 seats from 225 seats, while electoral system to single-member-district two-vote system from multimember districts. In January 12, 2008, then, the new seventh parliament continually operating with the same consultation system, what kind of the results will be presented is expected. Taiwan's Legislative Yuan, in the end, is playing a rubber stamp, or a kind of keeping in balance between the supervision of the executive checks? This is bound to understand the legislative procedure - the consultation system between governing and opposition parties.