英文摘要 |
This study explores managers' choice between classification shifting, accruals-based earnings management, and real earnings management. Specifically, we investigate whether firms with less flexibility in classification shifting increase the use of accruals-based earnings management and real earnings management, and whether firms with less flexibility in accruals-based earnings management increase the use of real earnings management. We also take into account the effect of board characteristics on the choice of earnings management mechanisms. The results show that (1) if the choice of classification shifting is impeded, the company is more likely to use accruals-based earnings management and real earnings management and (2) if the choice of accruals-based earnings management is restricted, the company is more likely to use real earnings management. In addition, board characteristics play a role in determining the choice between alternative earnings management methods. When the choice of classification shifting is impeded, we find that (1) accruals-based earnings management is affected by chairman internalization, the proportion of outside directors, and board size, and that (2) real earnings management is affected by chairman internalization, the proportion of outside directors, and directors' shareholdings. If the choice of accrual-based earnings management is impeded, real earnings management is affected by chairman internalization, the proportion of outside directors, and directors' shareholdings. |