解任壓力、債權人策略性融資與審計品質

Dismissal Threats, Strategic Lending, and Audit Quality

本研究採多期訊號賽局分析公司經營者對審計報告之偏好是否會影響其聘任會計師之決策，並影響會計師之審計品質（包括會計師之獨立性與保守程度）。此外，本研究亦引入債權人策略性融資行為，以探討策略性融資對均衡之影響。本研究將會計師之獨立性定義為「當會計師確定公司之經營狀況不佳時，是否會如實出具對公司較為不利之保留意見審計報告」；而保守程度則定義為「當會計師對公司之經營狀況不確定時，是否會出具對公司較為不利之保留意見審計報告」，並假設審計市場上存在兩種類型之會計師，型一會計師在出具錯誤無保留意見時所承受之名譽與訴訟損失較型二會計師為高。研究結果顯示，當債權人完全依照審計報告決定是否融資時，兩類會計師在面對解任壓力下，皆可能為了維持競爭優勢，而喪失獨立性或較不保守，惟型一會計師，其獨立性與保守程度皆不低於型二會計師。而當債權人之融資決策除考量審計報告外，亦決定於其對會計師類型之評估時，則兩類會計師之獨立性將趨於一致，但型一會計師相較於型二會計師，仍有相同或較高之保守程度。

This paper adopts a multi-period signaling game model to investigate how a client's preference over the audit opinion affects his/her willingness to retain the auditor and the audit quality, measured by the degree of auditor independence and conservatism. In addition, creditors' lending behaviors are introduced to examine the effects of strategic lending on equilibrium. The degree of auditor independence is defined as whether an auditor issues an unfavorable opinion (qualified audit report) when he/she learns that the firm's state is bad, while the degree of conservatism is whether an auditor issues an unfavorable opinion (qualified audit report) when he/she is uncertain about the firm's state. We assume that there are two types of auditors in the audit market. The reputation and liability costs of an erroneous unqualified opinion are higher for the type I auditor than those for the type II auditor. The results show that, when creditors make their lending decisions based solely on audit reports, with dismissal threats, both types of auditors could compromise their independence or become less-conservative to maintain the competitive advantage. Besides, the type I auditor is weakly more independent and more conservative than the type II auditor. However, when creditors make their lending decisions based on both audit reports and the perceived types of the auditors, the type II auditor's independence will be enhanced and the difference in independence across the two types of auditors will be eliminated. Still, the type I auditor is weakly more conservative than the type II auditor.