淨值門檻管制會誘發盈餘管理嗎？

Do Regulatory Thresholds of Equity Per Share Induce Earnings Management?

自1998年起，我國證券主管機關以每股淨值低於10元（5元）作為上市（櫃）公司暫停其股票信用交易（變更交易方法）之審查依據。此舉可能使管理當局產生以淨值門檻作為標的進行盈餘管理的誘因，以避免公司股票被暫停信用交易或變更交易方法而造成公司股價的下跌。本文旨在探討當市場知道公司淨值低於面值及面值的50％時，是否有顯著的負異常報酬，並進一步探討管理當局是否因此一門檻管制，而誘發管理當局進行盈餘管理。實證結果發現，投資者視每股淨值低於門檻為壞消息，並對股價報酬產生負面影響，尤以跌破5元門檻較10元門檻反應更為強烈。此外，由每股淨值之分配及裁決性應計數均可以發現，管理當局將淨值門檻視為標的並以增加流動裁決性應計數或現金流量的方式進行盈餘管理，避免每股淨值跌破門檻所引發之股價下跌。

The securities authority in Taiwan mandated specific standards for determining the eligibility of securities for margin purchase and short sale transactions in year 1998. Generally, if the equity per share is under NT$ 10, the purchase of securities on margin and short selling would be suspended. Further, if the equity per share falls below NT$ 5, the security would then be placed under an altered trading method. These rules may give managers incentives to manipulate earnings to prevent the adverse effects on firm value due to such regulatory special treatments. Given this background, this study investigates how investors and managers respond to these thresholds. The results show that the market reacts negatively if the equity per share does not meet the thresholds and that this negative reaction is more pronounced for firms missing the NT$ 5 threshold than the NT$ 10 threshold. In addition, we find that managers are likely to manipulate discretionary accruals or operating cash flows upward in order to achieve these thresholds, which could in turn avoid the special treatments from regulators and the subsequent negative perceptions from users of financial reports.