台灣稻穀保價收購措施調整為直接給付措施之研析

The Feasibility of Direct Payments as a Substitute for Price Support Program

長久以來我國稻穀保價收購措施對 AMS 有很高依存度，由於未來國際上極可能達成進一步削減總 AMS 與設定個別產品 AMS 上限之共識，使我國現行保價措施面臨調整壓力，最近和我國談判立場相近之日本與韓國均以直接給付措施取代其稻穀保價收購措施，更加深政策調整急迫性，有鑑於此本研究主要目的在於研擬我國稻穀保價收購措施之替代方案，並評估這些替代方案對農民所得與政府財政負擔之效果。本研究提出之替代方案包括：稻米直接給付措施（方案 A）與有較嚴格資格認定之稻米直接給付措施（方案 B）。研究結果顯示，若政策調整後市場價格跌幅在 15%內，農民收入仍可維持在目前水準，然收入結構中來自政府補貼比例將降低，而政府財政負擔將低於目前水準。此外，若以產業結構調整為主要考量，建議採納有最低面積、產品品質或最高年齡限制等之稻米直接給付措施（方案 B）取代稻穀保價收購措施，因其不僅可維持稻農所得更可達產業結構調整目的。

The rice guaranteed purchase program is highly subject to the allowance of AMS. The latest draft of WTO new round agricultural negotiation, however, reveals the consensus that the future AMS will be reduced and more restrictive. Moreover, the restriction may be applicable to individual agricultural products. Japan and Korea which take negotiating stand close to Taiwan, have replaced their price support programs by direct payments. Justifying the use of rice guaranteed purchase in Taiwan will never be tougher. To cope with the potential AMS reduction and stringent restriction on rice, the current research explores the feasibility whether the direct payment can substitute for the rice guaranteed purchasing and how deeply the public finance or farmers’welfare will be impacted by switching to the direct payment programs. Based on the experiences in Japan and Korea, we set up two hypothetical schemes where scheme A is a direct payment program and scheme B contains the context of scheme A plus firm restrictions on farmers’qualification to apply for the direct payments. The simulation results suggest that direct payment program is superior to the current guaranteed purchasing in that public finance burden will be lessened and the proportion of the farmer’s income coming from the government support will be lowered by the adoption of the direct payment, suppose that the current farmer income level holds unchanged and the rice price drops less than 15 percent. Also, direct payment programs can help speed up the structural adjustment by setting the qualifications on the age, culturing areas, rice quality and etc. The simulation of scheme B proves this point.