英文摘要 |
In 1944, the Nationalist Government suffered serious reverses because of Operation Ichigo of the Imperial Japanese Army. In order to turn the tide, Chiang Kai-shek launched a comprehensive military reform program. Scholars have focused on the re-organization of the armed forces, but neglected the logistics apparatus of the National Revolutionary Army. This article examines the institutional changes of the National Revolutionary Army's logistics and supply practices. This article argues that the upper echelon of the logistics organization was changed through three phases. In the first phase, the role of the Rear Area Logistics Bureau 後方勤務部 was strengthened and the responsibilities of the Ministry of War were reduced. In the second phase, when Chen Cheng assumed office as the Minister of War 軍政部長, the importance of the Ministry of War was re-emphasized, and Rear Area Logistics Bureau was demoted to become the Rear Area Logistics Command 後方勤務總司令部. Several logistics commands were merged and the practice of designated supply zones promoted. The last phase took effect within one year after the war, when the Combined Service Forces was set up and the logistics units were re-organized. Thus logistics were transformed from the Japanese style to the American style, while the reforms were beset by personnel struggles, institutional defects, and environmental restrictions. |