「服遠」與「治近」：嘉靖二十六年明廷的遣明使處置

“Pacifying the Distant” and “Managing the Near”: The Ming Court’s Handling of the Japanese Diplomatic Mission in 1547

明朝政府對嘉靖二十六年策彥周良使團的處置與應對，是「寧波之役」延長線上的一個重要事件，也成為牽涉明朝政治、軍事、外交與內政等多方面的一個複雜問題。圍繞日本入貢使團的處置，嘉靖君臣最關心的並非堅守「十年一貢」原則，而是在不失國家「大信」的基礎上，以「納貢」為前提如何有效處理相關違制問題。可以說，明朝政府在「十年一貢」制度的實踐中，表現出很強的彈性與張力，也展現出嘉靖君臣對日本國交關係的重視與期待。這也是「寧波之役」事件後，明朝政府處理對日關係的基本理念。策彥周良入明之時，適值明朝走私貿易猖獗、「倭寇」問題凸顯、內部政治鬥爭漸趨激烈，朱紈也因此採取了「詳內畧外、治近服遠」的處置策略。他在竭力安撫日本入貢使團的過程中，也借防備、保護使團的名義，完成了剿滅雙嶼港海寇的軍事部署；在稽天事件中，又欲通過恩威並施的方式，藉助日本之力協助明朝完成「去中國之盜」的「治近」目標。甚至在他與閩浙豪族勢力的交鋒中，「治近」與「服遠」問題也錯綜複雜地交織在一起，並成為雙方互相攻訐的武器。朱紈死後不僅「擅殺」罪名成立，還被附加上了「服遠不能」的問責。可以說，明廷對策彥周良使團的處置與應對，並不衹是一個簡單的外交事件，同時也深刻反映了明朝政府所面臨的諸多內政問題。 The coping strategy that the Ming government adopted on Sakugen Shūryō mission in 1547 was a significant and complicated result of the “Ningbo Incident,” involving problems in politics and diplomacy, and in military and internal affairs. As the Jiajing Emperor and his officials discussed the management of the Japanese delegation, they were more concerned with controlling illegal behavior, rather than insisting upon tribute delegations every ten years. In other words, the Ten-year Tribute Policy was both flexible and tense, indicating the seriousness with which the Jiajing court regarded its relations with Japan in the wake of the Ningbo Incident. When Sakugen Shūryō and his mission arrived in China, the Ming court faced numerous problems, including the smuggling trade, rampant Japanese piracy, and fierce internal factional political struggles. For these reasons, Zhu Wan pursued a strategy of concentrating on domestic affairs and dealing with foreign matters lightly, “managing the near-at-hand, while pacifying the distant.” Working hard to appease Sakugen Shūryō’s delegation, he used the pretext of military preparedness and protection of the delegation in deploying forces to wipe out the Japanese pirates at the port of Shuangyugang. In the Jitian incident, he used a strategy of combining intimidation and benevolence, enlisting the aid of Japan in the Ming court’s effort to “rid the Middle Kingdom of its enemies,” which was the goal of “managing the near-at-hand.” In his clashes with powerful clans in Fujian and Zhejiang, the policy of “managing the near-at-hand” and “pacifying the distant” became intertwined in a complex fashion, as he used each side as a weapon against the other. After his death, Zhu Wan was accused of being a murderer, and also a failure in his handling of foreign affairs. Thus it is clear that the handling of the Sakugen Shūryō mission by the Ming court was not just a simple diplomatic matter, but rather a reflection of the broader range of problems that the Ming court faced at that time.

The coping strategy that the Ming government adopted on Sakugen Shūryō mission in 1547 was a significant and complicated result of the “Ningbo Incident,” involving problems in politics and diplomacy, and in military and internal affairs. As the Jiajing Emperor and his officials discussed the management of the Japanese delegation, they were more concerned with controlling illegal behavior, rather than insisting upon tribute delegations every ten years. In other words, the Ten-year Tribute Policy was both flexible and tense, indicating the seriousness with which the Jiajing court regarded its relations with Japan in the wake of the Ningbo Incident. When Sakugen Shūryō and his mission arrived in China, the Ming court faced numerous problems, including the smuggling trade, rampant Japanese piracy, and fierce internal factional political struggles. For these reasons, Zhu Wan pursued a strategy of concentrating on domestic affairs and dealing with foreign matters lightly, “managing the near-at-hand, while pacifying the distant.” Working hard to appease Sakugen Shūryō’s delegation, he used the pretext of military preparedness and protection of the delegation in deploying forces to wipe out the Japanese pirates at the port of Shuangyugang. In the Jitian incident, he used a strategy of combining intimidation and benevolence, enlisting the aid of Japan in the Ming court’s effort to “rid the Middle Kingdom of its enemies,” which was the goal of “managing the near-at-hand.” In his clashes with powerful clans in Fujian and Zhejiang, the policy of “managing the near-at-hand” and “pacifying the distant” became intertwined in a complex fashion, as he used each side as a weapon against the other. After his death, Zhu Wan was accused of being a murderer, and also a failure in his handling of foreign affairs. Thus it is clear that the handling of the Sakugen Shūryō mission by the Ming court was not just a simple diplomatic matter, but rather a reflection of the broader range of problems that the Ming court faced at that time.