承包型法治：理解“地方法治”的新視角

Contracted Managerial Rule of Law： Understanding 'Local Rule of Law' from a New Perspective

在當代中國的國家治理中，超大型國家治理、中央集權單一制和“強國家－－弱社會”這三重因素的共同存在，使得國家治理面臨著巨大的治理負荷壓力。為了有效應對統治風險、治理成本和品質壓力等治理負荷難題，行政發包製作為一種可行的制度安排得以產生。相應地，由行政發包制的制度背景所決定，當代中國的地方法治在性質上屬於一種獨特的“承包型法治”樣態，介於代理型法治和自治型法治之間，具有法治建設強激勵、中央弱控制、爭端解決方式行政化等特點。承包型法治建設具有兩面性，容易造成政績驅動型法治與權利選擇性保護、法治試驗的創新性與投機性、指標控制與指標應對、柔性運作與法制化解決間的一系列二元張力。承包型法治的未來轉型，取決於行政發包制的可能變化，其轉型前景和方向具有不確定性。

In the process of contemporary China's state governance, the status quo of ultra-large state governance, centralized unitary system and 'strong state, weak society' structure place China's state governance under a great pressure. In order to remedy the situation caused by the risk of rule, governance cost and quality pressure, administrative subcontract system as a feasible institutional arrangement has been introduced in actuality. Accordingly, determined by administrative subcontract system, the local rule of law in contemporary China belongs to a unique contracted managerial rule of law, lying between deputy rule of law and autonomous rule of law, manifesting its feature in the domain of incentive mechanism, central government control degree and dispute settlement system. The contracted managerial rule of law has double effects, i. e. on one hand, it stimulates local government to construct rule of law, go in for various kinds of local legal experiment and so on, and on the other hand, it brings about a series of problems such as selective rights protection, speculative local legal experiment, opportunistic index evaluation coping strategy and the like. Furthermore, the future transition of contracted managerial rule of law whose prospect and direction are uncertain depends on the possible change of administrative subcontract system.