中國法律權力的聯邦制實踐－－以勞動合同法領域為例

The Practice of Federalism in Chinese Legal System: An Empirical Study on Labor Contract Law

從中央與地方關係的視角來看，當代中國立法權與司法權的配置與實施的顯著特徵是，雖然中央的立法權與司法權在法理上具有無可爭議的領導地位，但是在實踐中，地方的立法權與司法權的重要性並不亞於前者。這種現象可被歸納為“單一制基調+聯邦制色彩”的國家結構形式。勞動合同法領域的實踐，便較為明顯地體現了立法權和司法權在當代中國的此種“聯邦制色彩”。以北京、上海和廣州這三個城市違紀解除勞動合同糾紛判決書為樣本所做的實證研究，從經驗層面證實了法律權力聯邦制實踐的事實影響，即各個地方不同的法律規則會導致對公民／企業權利的差異性保護，在勞動合同法領域的實踐中，這具體體現在對勞動者（企業）有利的法律規則會導致對勞動者（企業）有利的司法裁判，並且在統計學意義上這種差別非常顯著。

From the perspective of central-local relations, there is an obvious 'Chinese characteristics' regarding the de jure allocation of legislative and judicial powers and their de facto practice. That is, while the national legislature and supreme court have an unchallengeably dominating position in the Chinese legal system on books, local practices are no less influential in action. The authors conceptualize this institutional phenomenon as 'federalist spectrum in a unitary background' of the Chinese legal system and examine the concept with an empirical study on labor contract law. The empirical study finds that there are enormous local labor contract laws and rules, which are significantly different from or even conflicting with national laws. In particular, regression analysis on 4,175 cases adjudicated by courts in Beijing, Guangzhou, and Shanghai confirms that localities have different positions in protecting employee rights, which is statistically significant.