晚宋軍情蒐集與傳遞－－以《可齋雜藁》所見宋、蒙廣西戰役為例

本文藉南宋李曾伯所撰之《可齋雜藁》為材料，探論皇帝與前線指揮官之間，如何進行訊息傳遞與情報蒐集，並嘗試分析其重要內容及政策取捨等問題。析論焦點以理宗所在之臨安，與廣南制置使司所在之靜江府二地之間傳遞的訊息為主，其次是潭州與臨安，及邕州與靜江府之間。蒙古因對宋發動「斡腹之謀」策略，圖謀自大理、安南與四川、湖北，對宋形成三面夾擊，廣西遂驟升為對蒙戰事前線。宋廷為掌握蒙軍在西南邊境的軍情，透過鄰近之安南、大理、羈縻溪洞，動員大批人力多方偵搜蒙軍軍情，使宋、蒙廣西之戰儼然成為大規模的情報戰。從宋、蒙廣西之戰可以觀察到，由於接收訊息管道及決策者立場的不同，易產生認知落差，對訊息的判斷與戰略決定，既有不同的考量，更可能影響防禦部署。同時，由於宋廷長期輕忽西南地區的經營，與大理、安南或諸蠻部之間，互信基礎薄弱，加上情勢緊迫，因此難以完整蒐集蒙古軍情。即便宋廷能在短期內透過不同管道，獲取大量蒙軍在鄰近地區活動的情報，仍因情資真偽難辨，而妨礙決策判斷。復以蒙古熟諳西南地區的地形，對少數民族的控御亦優於宋朝，況且宋、蒙戰力懸殊，宋終究仍難抵抗蒙古的進犯。

This article uses the writings of Li Zengbo 李曾伯, a leader of the Southern Song resistance against the Mongol forces in Guangxi 廣西, to examine the collection of military intelligence and its circulation between leaders on the front line and the emperor in the late Song. Questions addressed include the time required for collection and circulation, the avenues through which it circulated, the people involved in the process, and the most important issues of the time and how they were decided. The focus is on the circulation of information between Lin’an 臨安, where the imperial government of Lizong理宗 resided, and the office of the Guangnan 廣南 military commissioner in Jingjiang 靜江 prefecture, and secondarily on the exchanges between Tanzhou 潭州 and Lin’an, as well as Yongzhou 邕州 and Jingjiang. Guangxi became a key battlefront in the Song resistance when the Mongols initiated a “strategy of encirclement,” attacking Guangxi via Dali 大理 and Annam 安南 in the southwest, combined with the military actions in Hubei 湖北 and Sichuan四川 to the north and northwest. In order to ascertain Mongol movements on the southwestern border, the Song court mobilized significant resources in Annam, Dali and the colonized tribes along the border, collecting information through a variety of channels. In this sense, the Guangxi front was a war of military intelligence. An examination of the Guangxi front shows that the variety of avenues by which intelligence was collected and the differing perspectives of the various people involved resulted in different judgments. Differing understandings of the intelligence and differing decisions on strategic matters arose out different sets of considerations, and this influenced the deployment of the defense forces. At the same time, the Song court’s lack of familiarity with the administration of the southwestern area and its poorly established relationships with Dali, Annam and the various tribes rendered it unable to obtain reliable intelligence about Mongol troop movements, particularly in a time of emergency. Even though the Song court was able to set up on short notice an intelligence network capable of tracking Mongol movements in the neighboring areas, Song ability to use that information to make military decisions was hampered by the quality of the intelligence and the difficulties in ascertaining truth and mistruth. Moreover, the Mongols, in contrast, showed familiarity with the geography of the southwest and facility in handling tribal peoples, and the military forces of the Song were at any rate far weaker than the Mongols, making it hard for them to resist the invasion in the end.