資源共有、生態旅遊與永續發展

Common-Pool Resources, Ecotourism and Sustainable Development

生態旅遊是建築在自然資源上的，但生態自然資源往往有著資源共有的問題。本文旨在建構一個納入資源共有屬性的生態旅遊模型，分析永續發展中在地居民與政府的角色。我們證明發展生態旅遊，未必保證生態園區得以永續發展，除非伴隨適當政策，例如減少生態區經營業者，和／或課徵生態旅遊稅。具體而言，我們證明存在兩個穩定均衡：一是生態資源存量較低或甚至為零的均衡，另一個是高資源存量的均衡。在低存量均衡，當沒有旅運成本的自由進入，以及無任何的環境維護成本下，則生態園區自然資源將會滅絕，出現共有地的悲劇。高資源存量均衡對應更高的社會福利，可以透過相關政策，例如生態旅遊稅、調整經營業者許可費、限制潛在遊客人數、或控制經營業者數量以達成。更重要的是，我們證明雖然高資源存量均衡比低資源存量均衡更好，但可能不是社會最適化的結果。社會福利極大只能透過直接對遊客課生態旅遊稅達成，不能僅僅藉由控制經營業者數量來達成。

This paper establishes an ecotourism model to analyze the role of local residents and government in achieving sustainable development. By incorporating into the model the properties of common-pool resources to which the tourism activities are linked, we prove that ecotourism does not guarantee sustainable development for a rural area unless it is accompanied by suitable policies of reducing firm numbers and/or the levying of a tourist tax. More specifically, we find two stable equilibria: one characterized by low or even a zero level of natural resources, and the other has a high level of natural resources. In low equilibrium, the extinction or zero stock of natural resources occurs under open access of zero transport cost and marginal environmental maintenance cost. High equilibrium corresponds to greater social welfare, which can be guaranteed through policies of a tourist tax, license fee, limiting the number of firms, and restrictions on the population of potential tourists. More importantly, we prove that although high equilibrium is better than low equilibrium, it may not be socially optimal. The maximum welfare can only be achieved by a direct tax on tourists and not solely by policies controlling the number of firms.