英文摘要 |
To explore the performance of R&D along the growth path of an economy, this paper considers a vertically connected imperfectly competitive market structure in the context of an endogenous growth model, where the intermediate goods firms and final goods firms interact with each other and the government implements a subsidy/tax policy. Our findings show that the amount of aggregate profits generated after forward or backward integration is based on the number of intermediate goods firms in relation to the number of final goods firms. In addition, when the firms engage in forward integration, the R&D activities will lead to ambiguous results according to the degree of competition in the final goods markets. If the final goods market is more imperfectly competitive, there will be too little R&D activity at the market equilibrium. Since the market equilibrium economic growth rate is lower than the socially optimal economic growth rate, the government should implement a subsidy policy so as to increase economic growth. On the other hand, if the final goods market is perfectly competitive, then there is too much R&D activity, and the government should implement a tax policy to boost economic growth. Lastly, the government can enforce the optimal subsidy/tax rate to increase the welfare of balanced growth equilibrium to the level of social optimum. |