知見空言——羅念菴論「學者」之過

Acquiring Mere Knowledge and Empty Moralizing: Luo Nianan on the Faults of Confucian Practitioners

在陽明後學的研究中，羅念菴思想的定位是個極富爭議的課題。當代新儒者唐君毅嘗指出念菴之學「純是一為己之學」，尤其關注妨礙良知在現實中充量表現的攙和問題。本文將建基於唐君毅的思考，繼而指出：克治修養儒家之道的「學者」種種「知見」、「意見」、「空言」之過，是念菴之學最為核心的問題意識。在念菴眼中，陽明的致良知教必須在「致」的工夫過程中方能真正實得。雖然對於念菴作為殊別的修道學者來說，「靜坐」工夫對之最為受用；但其重視「信」、「實」的「靜功」卻是通乎心學工夫實踐不可或缺的元素，離乎此一切對良知的「知」、「見」、「言」都只會淪為虛妄。本文嘗試揭示與澄清念菴之學這種針對「學者」之過的問題意識，並希望由此能夠幫助學界給予念菴之學一個更為持平的定位。

The positioning of Luo Nianan’s 羅念菴 philosophy has always been a controversial issue within the academy. Tang Junyi 唐君毅, a contemporary New Confucian thinker, understands Luo’s philosophy to be “purely a philosophy for oneself,” and one which focuses on the problem of the adulteration of l i a n g z h i (良知 intuitive understanding) with the outside world. Based on Tang’s insights, this paper argues that the key concern of Luo’s philosophy is what he sees as the faults of Confucian self-cultivation: the acquisition of mere knowledge, opinion, and empty moralizing. In Luo’s view, Wang Yangming’s 王陽明 teaching of the extension of intuitive understanding can only be realized through real practice. Although Luo believes that the practice of meditation particularly benefits a certain kind of practitioner, the cultivation of tranquility is an indispensable element of Neo-Confucian idealist practice. Without real practice, all the knowledge, insights, and verbalizations of intuitive understanding prove to be illusive. Through the above discussions, this paper attempts to reconsider the positioning of Luo’s philosophy and provide a more just evaluation of its merits.