牟宗三先生的哲學詮釋中之方法論問題

The Hermeneutical Problems in Mou Tsung-san’s Philosophical Interpretation

眾所周知，牟宗三先生對中國哲學的詮釋深受西方哲學（尤其是康德哲學）之影響。他不但採用了康德哲學底若干重要概念（例如「智的直覺」、「自律」、「物自身」），也從康德那裏借用了「現象」與「物自身」底哲學間架。 他甚至認為：這個間架是中西哲學共有的哲學間架，具有普遍的意義。有人認為他的哲學詮釋扭曲了康德底原意，也有人指摘他將中國哲學硬套入康德底哲學架構中。本文首先檢討馮耀明先生從方法論底角度所提出的「概念相對論」，反駁他對於牟先生底哲學詮釋的質疑。其次，筆者根據牟先生底著作，勾勒出他的詮釋學原則。最後，筆者從西方詮釋學底脈絡闡明牟先生底詮釋學原則所涵的方法論意義，為他的哲學詮釋方法提出辯解。

Mou Tsung-san's interpretation of Chinese philosophy is characterized by the influence of Western philosophy, especially that of Kant. In Mou's interpretation he uses not only Kant's philosophical terms, such as “thing in itself, ” “intellectual intuition, ” and “autonomy，” but also his philosophical framework of “appearance” and “thing in itself. ” Mou even views this framework as the common model for all philosophical thinkings. His interpretation of Chinese philosophy has encountered criticisms from two sides: on the one hand, he has been reproached for distorting Kant's “original” philosophy; on the other hand, he has been criticized for reading too much Kant into Chinese philosophy. In this paper, I first defend Mou's philosophical interpretation against the methodological criticism which appeals to Quine's conceptual relativism.” Then I reconstruct Mou's hermeneutical principles according to his works. In the end, by explicating the hermeneutical implications of his method of philosophical interpretation, I try to give a justification for his approach.