安然事件對現代公司管理和控制的啟示－－初步回顧

自1980年以來學術界就對公司法和公司治理，包括公司併購展開了研究。安然案件對研究成果中最核心的一些觀點和做法提出了挑戰，特別是對廣泛接受的有關公司治理的模式至少提出了以下問題：第一，它給我們提供了一些新的理由質疑有效市場假說的適用。安然案中，盡管依賴有水分的審計報告的做法明顯是不明智的，公司的股票價格還是達到了令人炫目的高度。第二，它動搖了我們對目前公司治理機制的信心。我們一直認為如果不能採取由股東自由介入市場從而對公司實行控制的控制機制，那麼其次的選擇就應該是由董事會施行監控職能－－這種治理機制的核心就是一個具有監控職能的董事會，但是安然案動搖了我們對這樣一個機制的信心。尤其是，在安然公司越來越倚重於以股價的波動來衡量和獎勵管理人員的業績的同時，安然董事會保護公司財務信息披露制度完整實施的能力卻沒有得到相應的加強。第三，它表明股票期權作為公司高層人員的一種薪酬方式是有其代價的，因為擁有期權有可能導致管理層過分樂於冒險。第四，它表明以股票為基礎的員工薪酬制度和員工退休計畫不能相互適應。概括來說就是，安然案對於越來越多的員工退休計畫不再採用限定福利計畫(defined benefit plan)而是採用限定投資計畫(defined contribution plan)的這一轉變提出了質疑，前一種計畫使員工成為風險承擔者和財務規劃者，而後者使公司承擔一定的風險並負有誠信規劃的責任(fiduciary planning obligation)。儘管安然案觸及的信息披露、監控及其他一些問題可能會引發一些有益的改革，這一案件也提醒我們，有一些問題的解決有賴於未必完美的激勵制度與人們的自我約束。

The Enron case challenges some of the core beliefs and practices that have underpinned various positions in the debates about corporate law and governance, including mergers and acquisitions, since the 1980s. In particular, Enron raises at least the following problems for the received model of corporate governance. First, it provides another set of reasons to question the strength of the efficient market hypothesis, here, the company’s dizzyingly high stock price despite transparently irrational reliance on its auditor's compromised certification. Second, it undermines faith in the corporate governance mechanism--the monitoring board--that has been offered as a substitute for unfettered shareholder access to the market for corporate control. In particular, the board’s capacity to protect the integrity of financial disclosure has not kept pace with the increasing reliance on stock price performance in measuring and rewarding managerial performance. Third, it suggests the existence of tradeoffs in the use of stock options in executive compensation because of the potential pathologies of the risk-preferring management team. Fourth, it shows the poor fit between stock-based employee compensation and employee retirement planning. More generally, it raise questions about the shift in retirement planning towards defined contribution plans, which make employees risk bearers and financial planner, and away from defined benefit plans, which impose some of the risk and fiduciary planning obligations on firms. Although the disclosure, monitoring and other failures may lead to useful reforms, Enron also reminds us that there is a problem that cannot be solved but can only be contained in the tension between imperfectly fashioned incentives and self-restraint.