英文摘要 |
For over a decade vigorous discussion has been taking place among scholars of Chinese legal history in Japan, the United States and China on the nature of the court decision in civil disputes during the Qing period. The focal point of the discussion concerns the questions “was the court decision on civil matters a judgment or mediation” and “was the decision based on the law or not”? Naturally, the answers to the questions depend on the definitions of“judgment”and“law.” Clarification of what was being done in the law courts of Qing China would help enrich our understanding of these concepts. Chapter 1 is an analysis of a series of documents in a dossier for a case concerning a dispute over household property division (Document number 22615) in Dan-Shui Archive, a collection of administrative records of a local government in Taiwan during the late nineteenth century. The forty-one documents in the dossier were produced by the parties in the dispute, their relatives, and the government officials from the beginning to the end of the dispute over a year and a half. In Chapter 2, based on my analysis in the first chapter I present the following theses: (1) the framework of dispute resolution in the courts of the Qing government did not rest on legal inference to find applicable law such as“land law”or“family law.”Instead, it rested on the judge’s ability to comprehensively evaluate the interests of the individuals involved and his intuitive sense of balance. A successful decision was regarded to be fair and consistent with“qingli”(reason and human feelings). (2)“Qingli” was not regarded as something that existed prior to the litigation or judge’s decision. It was not something that the judge could“rely on”in making his decisions. It was“revealed”in a decision that successfully brought the dispute to an end. (3) It would be possible to understand decision-making at the court not as the process of application of a given norm to the decision on a particular case. Instead, we can understand it as the process of arriving at a shared sense of balance between the parties involved as well as the public which observantly followed the case. The judge’s decision can be characterized as an articulation of the“commonly shared opinion”of those who were involved. Because of this, the court had the power to compel the parties in the lawsuit to accept its decision. (4) In a sense,“qingli”is particularistic because it appears in various manifestations in ad hoc decisions on numerous kinds of cases. At the same time, it is universalistic because it is an expression of the commonly shared sense of justice. Perhaps it can be appropriately called“law” in its broadest definition. Still it was not regarded as the norm for decision making. |