公司破產邊緣董事不當激勵的法律規制

Directors' Civil Liability in Vicinity of Insolvency

董事作出商業決策時的激勵結構與公司的經營和財務狀況具有直接的相關性。當公司具有持續營業能力時，董事的風險偏好是中性的。可是，當公司處於破產邊緣時，董事則具有以債權人的利益為代價實施高風險、高收益商業決策的不當激勵。許多國家公司法或破產法都提出了相應的法律策略，以約束董事的這種不當激勵並保護債權人利益。我國破產法應要求債權人承擔一般性的破產申請義務，在此基礎上，進一步規定董事承擔在一定期限內提出破產申請的義務，否則就要對債權人因遲延申請破產所受的損失承擔賠償責任。The incentive structure for directors to make decisions is directly related to operation and finance of a company. Directors' risk preference is neutral when the company is a going concern. However, when the company is in the vicinity of insolvency, directors, at the expense of the benefit of creditors, will use perverse incentives to make decisions that are of high risk and high profit. Relative strategies have been conceived in company or bankruptcy laws in many countries to limit directors' perverse incentives and protect creditors. China's bankruptcy law should require debtors to undertake a general duty to file for bankruptcy, and further specify that directors shall have the duty to file within a limited period or they shall be liable for creditors' losses out of the delay of filing.