從斯賓諾莎的實體到黑格爾的主體

From Spinoza's Substance to Hegel's Subject

本文旨在詮釋黑格爾如何揭示斯賓諾莎哲學「實體」概念的缺失，以及他如何吸收包含斯賓諾莎「實體」的必然性思維的優點於自己的《邏輯學》體系之內，補之以自由概念，合必然性與自由兩個相對反的範疇，統一為黑格爾的「主體」範疇。斯賓諾莎關於個體回歸到大全的結論「其難得正如它們的稀少一樣」，與黑格爾的結論「獲得絕對知識的必然性」大相逕庭。兩人觀點差異的關鍵處在於：斯賓諾莎哲學以黑格爾所謂的第一重否定「一切規定性都是否定性」為基本原則。黑格爾則依第二重否定「一切否定性都是規定性」原則以「棄」第一重否定，並包含第一重否定於「兩重否定」之內以「揚」之。

The purpose of the present article is to explicate how Hegel cancels the defects of Spinozan concept of Substance, and how he preserves the advantage of necessity of Substance and absorbs it into Hegelian category of Subject. Both Spinoza and Hegel share the common aim of the individual's return into the One. The former concludes that 'all things excellent are as difficult as they are rare', whereas the latter deduces the necessity of final acquisition of absolute knowledge. The crux of dramatic contrast between the two is the following: Spinoza bases his philosophy on the principle of first negation: omnis determinatio est negatio. Hegel sublates it by the principle of second negation: omnis negatio est determinatio, and in so doing, integrates both moments of necessity and freedom into his category of Subject.