Export Subsidy under Strategic Delegation

策略授權下之最適出口補貼

This paper demonstrates that in Brander-Spencer model with symmetric delegation, optimal subsidy under market share delegation lies between simple Cournot competition and sales delegation. Furthermore, because the social welfare under market share delegation is large than those of sales delegation case, so even two export firms still involve in a “Prisoner’s Dilemma”, but market share delegation is in less degree. 本文在Brander-Spencer之兩國第三地市場競爭模型下，探討市場份額之管理授權如何影響最適出口補貼之決定，並與銷售額授權和Cournot數量競爭做比較。証明結果發現，市場份額授權下之最適出口補貼值落於銷售額授權和Cournot數量競爭之間，市場份額授權下之兩國福利會優於銷售額授權之情況，兩出口廠商在加入管理授權下之後雖仍會陷入囚犯兩難境界，不過市場份額相較於銷售額授權較不嚴重。