我國地方政府從事兩岸城市交流權限之析探：理性選擇制度論的觀點

An Analysis of Taiwan Local Governments for City-Based Cross-strait Exchanges: The Rational Choice Institutionalism Perspective

本文以理性選擇制度論為基礎以探討2018年九合一大選後，民進黨執政的中央政府與在野黨執政的地方政府，就兩岸城市交流其權限的議題予以探討。本文的問題意識係以權限劃分為基礎並解析三項問題：第一，中央政府在兩岸城市交流扮演何種權責角色？第二，我國直轄市、縣（市）地方政府如何推動兩岸城市交流？第三，中央與地方在權限劃分且垂直分立式府際關係的結構之下，對兩岸城市交流議題面向的互動策略為何？綜上，本文在文獻回顧的部分，探討臺灣在單一國結構下其中央政府在權限劃分的制度意涵，然後討論中央與地方對於政策自主性的歧異，並解析中央與地方在垂直式分立政府結構下的影響。在研究方法上採用理性選擇制度論分析敘事的途徑，並搭配空間模型作為本文研究的分析架構。本文發現：第一，中央政府在憲法權限劃分的制度設計，以及單一國結構下其與地方政府的關係，在兩岸關係條例的規範下具備了制度性否決者的權力影響地方政府推動兩岸城市交流的議題內容、效力範圍與合作程度。第二，從敘述統計的分析資料中發現，各縣市在成立兩岸小組的時間點與地方首長選舉具有關聯性，而且成立兩岸小組時間的先後，也顯現出藍綠政黨的縣市長對於兩岸城市交流具有高度的相同性，其權責大多交由研考類的機關或單位處理，並非以經濟類機關或單位為主。第三，透過空間模型的分析，在垂直式分立政府的結構下在野黨籍地方縣市長藉由議題設定的方式，以對立不合作或討價還價的策略與執政黨中央政府進行策略性互動，且彼此對於兩岸政策目標不一致，使得雙方關係容易形成相互爭奪的非合作賽局抑或是議價協商的混合賽局的情境。

This article is based on the theoretical approach of Rational Choice Institutionalism (RCI) and analyzed the issues of Taiwan Local Governments for city-based cross-strait exchanges. There are three main questions in the article: First, what are the institutional implications for the central government under the division of powers and how to control or manage the cross-strait exchange policies from the local governments? This question is part of policy consistency. Second, Taiwan local governments how to push cross-strait exchange policy under the current mechanisms and what are the strategic options for local actors in the vertical intergovernmental relations? It means the local governments pursue their policy autonomy for more powers. Third, central and local governments how to interact strategically under the structure of vertically divided government? This essay debated the meanings of rational choice institutionalism, the issues of the division of powers under Taiwan's constitution, related laws, administrative rules, and local autonomy literature. Meanwhile, the research adopted the method of analytic narratives and used a theoretical model to analyze the above questions. The results in this article shows: first, the central government actor as the institutional veto player to manage or veto the applications from local governments about city-based cross-strait exchanges; second, the local actors used the strategy of agenda-setting to fight for the autonomy of cross-strait exchange policy; third, between the local governments by the opposition party and central government by the ruling party, their relationships are either a non-cooperative game or bargaining game depended on both the outcomes of interaction and the contingency of political events.