中文摘要 |
隨著反傾銷稅及平衡稅等貿易救濟措施之增加,反規避條款之適用亦愈趨頻繁且產生了若干隱憂。進口國雖然認為反規避措施係為了處理規避反傾銷稅及平衡稅之問題而具有正當性,但規避行為同時有可能僅是生產者或出口商的在進口國或第三國的直接投資行為。與反傾銷稅及平衡稅係受WTO反傾銷協定及補貼暨平衡稅措施協定規範不同,WTO 對於反規避措施並未加以規範,因此產生了適用上之若干問題。若進口國對於原本非屬反傾銷稅調查對象之進口產品,以反規避調查之方式擴大對其適用反傾銷稅,即表示對於未曾進行反傾銷調查之產品課徵反傾銷稅,此舉即有違反反傾銷協定之問題。對於實施反規避調查行之有年的歐盟以及其近年來對中國大陸產品所進行之反規避調查,是觀察反規避措施是否符合WTO 規範是最佳範例。而臺灣與中國大陸產品因存在上下游關係,更常被視為反規避調查之對象。本文即針對歐盟的反規避條款及其實施案例進行研究,並發現多數規避行為與關稅規避行為並無不同,在關稅法下即可處理。若改用較無共識存在之反規避調查來處理關稅詐欺問題,恐有擴張反傾銷法適用範圍並造成貿易障礙之虞。
Accompanying an increase of anti-dumping measures, anti-circumventionactions aim to prevent escapes from the anti-dumping measures, but alsoraise certain concerns. An Importing country may have justified reasons toinitiate anti-circumvention investigation on the importing products notincluded in the original anti-dumping measures, because circumventionnullifies or reduces effective antidumping. However, circumvention might bejust nothing more than direct investment in the importing country or a thirdcountry. Anti-dumping measures are regulated by the ADA while the anticircumventionmeasures are not. When an importing country engages aninvestigation of anti-circumvention to the products which have never beenthe subject of previous anti-dumping investigations and expands the measureto that products, concerns about the WTO consistency might be raised. EUhas a long historical experience with using anti-circumvention measures tocombat evasion of antidumping duties. This article discusses the legal contextand recent development of EU’s anti-circumvention measures, especially thecases involved with Taiwan. We found that most cases involve customs fraud,against which most countries have established regulations and practices otherthan anti-circumvention provisions. Using less-consensus and arguable anticircumventioninvestigation to combat customs fraud and enlarge the scope ofinvestigation to the real producers have resulted in trade barriers forlegitimate business activities. |
英文摘要 |
Accompanying an increase of anti-dumping measures, anti-circumventionactions aim to prevent escapes from the anti-dumping measures, but alsoraise certain concerns. An Importing country may have justified reasons toinitiate anti-circumvention investigation on the importing products notincluded in the original anti-dumping measures, because circumventionnullifies or reduces effective antidumping. However, circumvention might bejust nothing more than direct investment in the importing country or a thirdcountry. Anti-dumping measures are regulated by the ADA while the anticircumventionmeasures are not. When an importing country engages aninvestigation of anti-circumvention to the products which have never beenthe subject of previous anti-dumping investigations and expands the measureto that products, concerns about the WTO consistency might be raised. EUhas a long historical experience with using anti-circumvention measures tocombat evasion of antidumping duties. This article discusses the legal contextand recent development of EU’s anti-circumvention measures, especially thecases involved with Taiwan. We found that most cases involve customs fraud,against which most countries have established regulations and practices otherthan anti-circumvention provisions. Using less-consensus and arguable anticircumventioninvestigation to combat customs fraud and enlarge the scope ofinvestigation to the real producers have resulted in trade barriers forlegitimate business activities. |