我國工會安全條款之功能與合法性討論——以美國法為比較對象

A Study on Functionality and Legality of Taiwan's Union Security Clause: A Comparative Study on the Laws of the United States and Taiwan

我國團體協約法早於1930年代開始施行，即包含封閉工廠條款此類型之工會安全條款。時至2011年施行新勞動三法，立法者考量到新工會法改採為自由入會制，恐削弱勞工加入工會之動機，不利於工會？？？？續與發展，因而於新團體協約法第13條增訂禁搭便車條款與代理工廠條款。然雖立法者預期工會安全條款具有前述鞏固工會之目的，為何仍少有工會成功簽訂之，其是否真有鞏固工會實力之功能？本文透過社會學工會組織理論與實證研究，發見由於我國工會尚處發展階段，使工會安全條款僅具備「避免會員流失」，而不具有「吸引會員加入工會」的功能，然結論而言，其仍有保障我國集體勞動權的意涵。此外，伴隨2016年起空服員工會與華航公司針對兩造簽訂的協議進行相關訴訟，工會安全條款是否產生如侵害非會員消極團結權、違反同工同酬等疑慮一時廣受討論，我國不乏有學者借鏡美國法以回應前述爭議。惟本文根據美國立法歷程與判決，發見由於美國採取排他性協商代表制，造成美國工會安全條款功能並非鞏固工會實力，而在於維持排他性協商代表制，保障勞工集體協商權，且其主要類型內容因涉及勞工工作權，對於勞工權益造成之影響較我國強烈，加之美國認定繳納一定費用即可取得會員資格，致美國合法性討論亦著重在言論自由，顯示美國法與我國法具有相當差異而難全面借鏡。惟美國為減緩工會安全條款對於勞工影響，所建立之相關制度，仍有值得我國參考之處。本文分析我國工會安全條款合法性後，認定消極團結權應屬一般行為自由，我國工會安全條款對此之限制，亦符合憲法合理審查標準。針對同工同酬疑慮，憲法第7條平等權針對會員/非會員所為之差別待遇，亦採合理審查標準，於我國工會安全條款得以保障勞工集體團結權，該差別待遇應屬合理，而無違反同工同酬之虞。最後，本文工會安全條款皆具有債法性條款，而得簽訂於一般性團體協議，間距條款所具備之法規性效力，亦得以真正利益第三人契約約定之。

Taiwan’s Collective Agreement Act (hereinafter the“Act”) came into effect in 1932, which also recognized closed shop clause, a type of union security clauses (hereinafter the“Clause”). Until 2011, non-compulsory-membership policy was adopted in Labor Union Act. To avoid new policy weakening workers’motivation to join labor unions, and thus affecting the survival and function of labor unions, Taiwan’s legislators added free-rider clause and agency shop clause to Article 13 of the Act. However, though the Clause’s purpose is to strengthen labor unions, rare labor unions succeeded to conclude it with employers. Through qualitative methodology and sociological theory, this study finds that the Clause does not motivate non-members to join labor unions, and avoid members dropping out of labor unions. Nevertheless, this result does not deny the Clause’s function to protect labor’s right to organize collectively (hereinafter the“Negative Right”).
In 2016, China Airlines filed a suit for legality of collective agreements with Taoyuan Flight Attendants Trade Union. Since the disputed suit also includes the legal problem of the Clause, the legality of the Clause is discussed widely by Taiwanese scholars. Some scholars tried to introduce US Law to discuss the legality of Taiwan’s Clause. Nonetheless, because the US adopts exclusive representation, the functionality of the US Clause is not to protect the right to organize collectively but to maintain the function of exclusive representation and protect labors’right to bargain collectively. Also, since the Clause in the US affects labors’right to work, it has more impacts on labors’right than in Taiwan. Moreover, Under US case law, because the Clause only requires members to pay agency fee, the US focuses on discussing if the Clause infringes labors’right to express. The above shows US system is different from Taiwan’s system and thus cannot be introduced into Taiwan’s discussion. However, Taiwan still can introduce US mechanism to mitigate the impact of the Clause. Finally, for the problem of non-members’Negative Right, since the restrictions of the Clause fit the rational basis of constitutional review, it does not infringe non-members’Negative Right. Moreover, though the Clause leads to differential treatments between members and non-members, these differential treatments still fit the rational basis of constitutional review due to its protection for labors right to organize collectively. Thus, the Clause does not violate laws in Taiwan. As for the analysis of the legality of the Clause, since the Clause only creates obligations between labor unions and employers, it can be concluded in a contract between labor unions and employers without following requirements under the Act.