| 英文摘要 |
In recent years, corporate improper investment behaviors have been frequently observed both domestically and internationally. Many studies attribute these phenomena to the greed of executives, particularly the control over resource allocation by board members and top management. Executives of fat cat firms are known for their excessive pursuit of personal interests and are often regarded as the core factor in ethical controversies surrounding corporate investment decisions. This study aims to explore the impact of fat cat firms on investments in tax havens and corrupt countries. Additionally, it examines the moderating effect of the zombie firm stage on the relationship between fat cat firms and international investment decisions. Using data from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) database, this study collects information on 325 publicly listed companies from 2013 to 2023 as the empirical research sample. The empirical results show that fat cat firms are positively associated with investments in both tax havens and corrupt countries, suggesting that abnormal executive compensation may influence firms to invest in regions with weaker regulatory oversight. Regarding the moderating effect, zombie firms do not significantly strengthen the tendency of fat cat firms to invest in tax havens, but they do enhance such firms’ inclination to invest in corrupt countries. Overall, the study provides empirical evidence on the international investment location choices of fat cat firms and aims to offer insights for future discussions on corporate governance and cross-border regulatory frameworks. |