| 英文摘要 |
This paper examines the ’’majority decision-making authority’’ and the ’’notification procedure’’ in land law, focusing on Article 34-1 of the Land Law and addressing controversies in their legal application and constitutional interpretation. The majority decision-making authority and notification procedure significantly impact fundamental rights; however, ambiguities in legal regulations lead to persistent disputes. Legal norms must ensure foreseeability and stability, not serve as traps for the unwary. Thus, laws must provide clear guidance and advance notice to individuals about prohibited actions and associated legal risks, ensuring the rational exercise of state power and a predictable legal order.The study evaluates the effects of majority decision-making authority on fundamental rights, including freedom of speech, property rights, contractual freedom, the right to life, freedom of movement, and adequate housing. Using third-party effect theory and interest balancing, it explores methods to reconcile conflicting rights. The constitutionality of majority decisionmaking authority is analyzed based on the principles of legal clarity, legal reservation, and proportionality, alongside a review of the notification procedure’s legal framework and the implications of procedural noncompliance. Drawing on the Grand Bench’s unified opinions, this paper assesses whether these provisions meet constitutional requirements for due process and procedural rights protection.Findings indicate that the majority decision-making authority and notification procedure fail constitutional scrutiny due to deficiencies in legal clarity, legal reservation, proportionality, and due process. The paper recommends clarifying the interpretation and application of majority decision-making authority and improving the notification procedure to harmonize the system with fundamental rights, reflecting the constitutional commitment to individual freedoms and rights. |