雙重股權結構在中國大陸的規範本土化與制度續造

Normative Localization and Institutional Renewal of Dual-class Stock Structures in Mainland China

雙重股權結構以股東異質化理論為基礎，能夠發揮維持公司創始人的控制權、抵禦敵意收購的功能，但也可能導致公司監督機制失靈，加劇股東間的利益衝突。為此，需要從公司融資和公司治理兩個層面實現其本土化和制度續造。從公司融資視角，在投資者進入階段，應當從公司主體資格和股東持股資格兩方面，對雙重股權結構的設立進行限制；同時建議引入燕尾條款，優化股份評估機制，從而為投資者提供有效退出管道。從公司治理視角，應當明確多重表決權的比例限制和表決事項範圍，並完善配套的轉換機制和資訊揭露機制，以規範權力的配置和運行。

Based on the theory of shareholder heterogeneity, dual-class stock structure can play the role of maintaining the control of the corporation’s founders and resist hostile takeovers, but it may also lead to the failure of the corporation’s monitoring mechanism and exacerbate the conflicts among shareholders. Therefore, it is necessary to realize its localization and institutional renewal from both aspects of corporate finance and corporate governance. From the perspective of corporate finance, the establishment of dual-class stock structure should be restricted in terms of corporate subject qualification and shareholders shareholding qualification at the stage of investor entry; at the same time, it is suggested to introduce coattail clause and improve the stock valuation rights system, so as to provide an effective exit channel for investors. From the perspective of corporate governance, the ratio limitation and the scope of decision matters of multiple voting rights should be clarified, and the supporting conversion mechanism and the information disclosure system should be improved in order to regulate the allocation and operation of power.