授權資本制的被代理人成本

The Principal Costs of The Authorized Capital System

占據公司治理主流地位的代理成本理論，強調對代理成本的抑制，包括對管理者（控制股東）的問責，而忽視被代理人成本。被代理人成本理論，強調被代理人向代理人授權，並保護該授權。授權資本制的制度利益，是降低被代理人成本。具體公司中的被代理人向代理人授權的程度，取決於授權產生的預期代理成本增加量和預期被代理人成本減少量二者之間的大小關係。臺灣的授權資本制有利於降低被代理人成本，而2023年中國大陸新《公司法》對授權資本制的具體設計，只允許現金認購，雖降低了代理成本，但是屬於被代理人成本比較高的授權資本制，是狹隘的授權資本制。

The agency cost theory, which occupies the mainstream position in corporate governance, emphasizes the suppression of agency costs, including the accountability of managers (controlling shareholders), while ignoring the principal costs. The principal costs theory emphasizes that the principal authorizes the agents to manage the corporation and protects this authorization. The institutional benefits of the authorized capital system is to reduce principal costs. The extent to which the principal in a specific company authorizes the agent depends on the relationship between the expected increase in agency costs and the expected decrease in principal costs resulting from authorization. Taiwan’s authorized capital system is conducive to reducing principal costs. However, the specific design of the authorized capital system in the Chinese (Mainland) new “Company Law” of 2023 only allows cash subscriptions by the subscribers. Although the agency costs would be reduced, the principal costs are relatively high under the Chinese(Mainland) regime of the capital formation, which would be a narrow authorized capital system.