「實質董事」之認定與其責任構建

The Study of Definitions and Regulatory Models of De Facto and Shadow Directors

實質董事是相對於法律上董事而言。實質董事又區分為事實上董事及影子董事，事實上董事自居為董事，卻也執行董事職務，影子董事典型則為控制股東，隱身幕後掌控公司營運。集中營運權力作為現代公司的典型特質，為避免享有高度控制權之管理層濫用權力，課其受託義務，但如究責對象限於形式上的管理層，而無法使實際上的支配者負起責任，將動搖公司治理基石。各國對於事實上董事，皆規定所負責任與法律上董事相同，但對影子董事則各異其趣。台灣立法採取事實上董事及影子董事責任相同，實質董事與法律上董事同負責任，無論在理論或實務，引發更多爭議。而中國大陸本次修法，採取影子董事與事實上董事分立，影子董事於損害公司或股東權益時需連帶負責，而事實上董事與法律上董事義務、責任相同。兩岸至今皆主要採英系立法例，建議應廢止關係企業專章，制定配套辨識控制股東及實際控制人，並令其負相應責任，在廢止法人代表人制前援用實質董事概念，使指派之法人權責相符。

A de facto director is a concept relative to that of a de jure director. This conceptcan be further divided into a purely de facto director and a shadow director. The former refers to someones who hold themselves out as directors and perform directors’ duties, while the latter refers to controlling shareholders who control or direct the management of the company behind the scenes. As modern companies are characterized by the feature of concentration of management power, control of abuse of such power becomes the cornerstone of corporate governance. Nevertheless, if only de jure directors are held accountable, accountability would seem shallow and meaningless. In many jurisdictions, a de facto director has the same responsibilities as a de jure director. A shadow director is, however, regulated differently in different jurisdictions subject to diverse policy considerations. Taiwan adopts a rather unique model, where a de facto director as well as a shadow director will be held liable if and only if a de jure director is found liable. In other words, de facto and shadow directors are considered merely vicariously liable.This is a highly controversial approach, which probably creates more problems than it solves. This article also compares the most recent legislations in Mainland China on de facto and shadow directors with the regulatory schemes of Taiwan. Both jurisdictions generally followed the British model, albeit some “adjustments”. Lastly, this article made some suggestions regarding Taiwanese legislations, for example, more measures should be introduced to identify controlling shareholders so that abuse of power by shadow directors be more effectively scrutinized.