保險業務自願結清之研究

A Research on Insurer’s Commutation

本文之目的，在於研究自願結清機制與相關利害衝突問題，並為我國法提出建議。本文主要可分為三大部分，首先由我國保險業之問題與長尾責任談起，再論述英美自願結清之特色與必要性，最後論及問題保險業中的利害衝突與公司治理問題。本文認為，結清制度可先適用於產險業，並採取監理官、債權人會議、法院之三階段同意架構，而由法院獨立就整體利益判斷後決定是否准許計畫。而在法院判斷的實質標準上，則應充分考慮不同種類要保人或被保險人之差異與利害衝突，債權人會議亦應考慮此一差異。有顯著差異者，應分組進行會議。最後，就問題保險公司治理而言，仍應以極大化公司價值為方向，但應先保障要保人或被保險人之權益為是。

This paper aims to analyze the commutation of insurers and relevant issues of conflict of interest, and then propose proper recommendations for Taiwan. Divided into three parts, the research begins with an analysis of issues facing Taiwan’s insurers and long-tail liability. Next, it introduces the characteristics and necessity of the commutation system. Finally, it addresses the conflict of interest and corporate governance issues for troubled insurers.
In detail, this paper proposes initiating a commutation mechanism starting with property insurers, utilizing a three-stage approval process involving the insurance authority, meetings of creditors, and court. This system designates the court to independently make the final decision as a whole while considering the difference between various policyholders or insureds and their conflict of interest. A meeting of creditors is required to account for the differences between them, ensuring that the insureds of IBNR are not placed in the same meeting with other insureds or creditors.
Ultimately, the corporate governance of troubled insurers should aim to maximize the values of firms while prioritizing the protection of policyholders or insureds.