英文摘要 |
Hansmann and Kraakman posited that the history of corporate law has come to an end due to the worldwide convergence towards shareholder primacy. Nevertheless, the advent of the platform age has transformed this landscape. This article identifies three features of stakeholder relationships in platform companies: (1) some stakeholders have stronger discretionary powers due to the substantial reduction in transaction costs; (2) a more stakeholder-oriented approach needs to be adopted due to stakeholders’pivotal contributions to firms’value creation; and (3) the power allocation between stakeholders is flexible and dynamic since the value of their investments is changeable. Accordingly, platform companies must adopt decentralised, stakeholder-oriented, flexible, and dynamic corporate governance norms. Corporate law should respond to rather than hinder the demands of platform companies. In this regard, corporate law should evolve to be more enabling than mandatory in power allocation and allow the co-existence of divergent corporate governance norms. |