英文摘要 |
In practical terms, the Constitution contains a set of apparently very paradoxical features. On the one hand, the constitution deals with many morally important and controversial topics in public life; on the other hand, it consists mainly of past political decisions and social conventions. The question of why past decisions are binding on issues of great importance in the present becomes a thorny problem that cannot be circumvented by constitutional theory. Prof. Tian Lei argues that since a constitution always formally implies a set of past political decisions, an account of the binding force of a constitution must seek to articulate its binding force by seeking a holistically coherent moral narrative "within" the context of constitutional practice, rather than by invoking general moral principles from outside the constitution. This idea makes it difficult to manage the relationship between the historical materials of constitutional practice and the overall coherent moral narrative, and often results in the compression and tailoring of historical materials in the pursuit of an overall coherent narrative. In contrast, a "convention-based inferentialist theory" requires first determining the independent normative status of particular historical materials and then inferentially seeking a possible coherent narrative on that basis. This avoids the problem of arbitrarily tailoring history in the search for a coherent narrative, while retaining the goal of seeking a coherent narrative in the constitution, although inferentialism no longer promises that this goal will necessarily be achieved. |