侵權行為損害賠償之預防目的──以法律實證分析為中心

The Deterrence Effect of Tort Damages: An Empirical Study via Public Bad Experiment

侵權行為法的兩大功能為損害填補及損害預防，其中損害預防功能係藉由行為規範的確定及損害賠償的制裁，以嚇阻侵害行為；而預防目的隨著時代的演進，愈展現其在損害賠償功能上的必要性。關於達成預防目的之賠償模式，其法律適用及數額決定之法理基礎，在英美法系和歐陸法系國家皆有激烈辯論。以預防目的最明確的懲罰性賠償為例，最常見之批評，在美國即為鉅額的懲罰性賠償金；而關於此類賠償的限制，如美國後續採取建議性質的賠償上限，或是移植該賠償制度的歐陸法系國家，採取實際損害的固定倍數的方式者，惟此等作法，難免有預防效果不足，或欠缺理論支持等質疑。本文透過公共惡賽局為架構的法律實驗方式，結合法律經濟理論，探究不同類型的損害賠償法則，在故意和過失的歸責態樣下，於預防功能的實證效果。本研究發現懲罰性賠償在預防故意侵權行為，有其顯著效果；相對而言，填補性賠償對於預防故意行為之效果不足，而比例上較為適合預防過失侵權行為，如適用懲罰性賠償至過失行為，其正當性恐有疑慮。

This study is the first effort to simultaneously manipulate subjective status and civil damage rules to test the deterrence effect on human tortious behavior. Using a public bad experiment, significant behavioral influences were identified in participants’ violations related to various damage rules under the intentional and negligent status of the tortfeasor. The results directly show the treatment effects on both factors, which extends previous studies on public good games regarding damage rules. The most insightful findings are: (1) punitive damage is effective in deterring intentional torts while compensatory damage is inadequate, and (2) compensatory damage is marginally most influential for negligent torts while imposing the punitive damage rule on negligent behavior is unjustified. By adopting cost internalization methods as the punitive award, our study provides an explanation and justification for punitive damages for intentional torts as it offers the most efficient deterrence effect and produces the highest social benefit.