混合寡占市場與最適貿易政策-考慮本國民營廠商的情況

Mixed Oligopoly and Optimal Trade Policy in the Presence of Domestic Private Firms

Long and Stahler (2009) 在國際的混合寡占市場且非線性的需求函數下探討民營化程度對策略性貿易政策的影響，然而該文並沒有考慮本國民營廠商存在，以致於民營化政策並沒有成本的節省效果。有鑒於此，本文將本國民營廠商納入考慮，依據本文的研究顯示，民營化政策所具有成本節省的效果將使得在最適的貿易政策下，市場的均衡價格、關稅稅率以及社會的福祉將與民營化程度有關，而非相互獨立，而且社會福祉將隨著民營化程度的增加而增加，因此最適的民營化政策應為完全民營；最適的補貼率與民營化程度也不具有單調遞增的性質。上述結果皆有異於Long and Stahler (2009) 的發現。

 

Long and Stahler (2009) examine the impact of privatization on strategic trade policy in an international mixed oligopolistic market with a non-linear demand function, however, the paper does not consider the presence of domestic private firms, so there is no cost-saving effect of privatization policy. In view of this, this paper takes the presence of domestic private firms into account. According to this paper, the cost-saving effect plays a key role, and the cost-saving effect of privatization policy will make the equilibrium price of the market, optimum tariff rate, and social welfare related to the degree of privatization rather than independent of each other under the optimal trade policy, and social welfare will increase with the increase of the degree of privatization. Therefore, the optimal privatization policy should be fully privatized. The optimal subsidy rate and the degree of privatization are not monotonically incremental in nature. All of these results are different from the findings of Long and Stahler (2009).